

Nationalism and Collaboration in the Anti-Japanese War 1912-1950

By Pete Sweeney

Historians will forget reality. They will invent thinking men, joined by mysterious fibers to an intelligible universe, possessed of sound farsighted views and pondering grave decisions according to the purest laws of Cartesian logic. There will be powers of good and powers of evil. Heroes and traitors. But treason implies responsibility for something, control over something, influence upon something, knowledge of something. Treason in our time is a proof of genius. Why, I want to know, are not traitors decorated?

--Antoine de Saint-Exupéry, *Flight to Arras*

The important thing is to appease the people's emotions. If the people's loyalties are not lost, then the foreign bandits can be handled.

--Qing Dynasty Emperor Daoguang

Knowing is not difficult, only doing presents difficulties.

--Yin Dynasty Emperor Wu Ding

Doing is not difficult, but knowing presents difficulties.

--Sun Yat-sen

Introduction

In 1945, China's long war against Japan ended not with a bang but a whimper. For over a century, Chinese military forces, howsoever well commanded and motivated, had faced defeat after humiliating defeat at the hands of more modernized, mechanized foreign armies. The first wave of European imperialist powers had been humiliated and cast out of Asia by a fellow Confucian civilization, Japan, and yet at the hands of the Japanese the rhetoric of Pan-Asian brotherhood was turned to the service of an even more brutal occupation. Complicating the matter was the seemingly eternal civil conflict. Throughout these sundry occupations, Chinese continued to fight Chinese over political, material, and ideological goods (such as the right to call yourself "Chinese"), with the frequent assistance of various foreign powers ever inclined to dabble and destabilize.

Only the most optimistic Chinese patriot, confronted with such a past and such a present, could have looked forward with any confidence to a near future in which China would be an independent, unified nation capable of protecting and improving the lives of its subjects. In early 1945, Chinese communist guerrillas, nationalist armies, independent warlords, and foreign military advisors still looked to a long war with uncertain prospects for victory and no certainty as to the quality of such a victory, should it arrive. Indeed unbeknownst to the Chinese, the Yalta conference had already produced a post-victory plan for restoring Western influence over the Chinese sphere without any consultation with Chinese leadership. And yet in August two atomic bombs, combined with a Soviet invasion of Manchuria, delivered a Japanese surrender delegation to the Chinese door within a month. The surrender was accepted aboard an American battleship by the Chinese General He Yingqin, a mediocre Nationalist commander who had never won a significant

engagement against Japan. He was an unextraordinary figure, but his presence signified the absence of any other national hero who could point to a decisive military victory, led by Chinese troops under his command, which had freed the nation from Japan. Chiang Kai-Shek and Mao Zedong could at best claim to have preserved their respective forces from annihilation. These were, in fact, impressive achievements in the context, but of a different quality.

General Wedermeyer, the American military commander in China, wrote to Washington that "if peace comes suddenly, it is reasonable to expect widespread confusion and disorder."ⁱ This was an understatement, as the ensuing civil war would soon demonstrate. Six days after the Japanese surrendered, Japanese units were already fighting alongside Nationalist forces against Communist encroachment.ⁱⁱ

It may seem axiomatic that resistance against a foreign occupier inevitably produces national cohesion. Ishii Itarō, chief of the Japanese government's Asia Bureau, believed Chiang Kai-Shek was successfully "using Japan as an instrument for unifying the nation."ⁱⁱⁱ Many Chinese nationalists of the period hoped that the war would supply the necessary heat to smelt the infamous Chinese "box of sand" into a hardier national compound. Ba Jin, a nationalist literary figure and propagandist wrote the "sound of gunfire united four hundred and fifty million people into a solid single body."^{iv}

And yet it did not. To adapt Benedict Anderson's memorable phrase, "the [Chinese] nation proved an invention on which it was impossible to secure a patent."^v Not only was the nation's definition disputed, many Chinese behaved in ways that hardly coordinated with the image of idealistic national sacrifice. What of the Chinese collaborators, the *banjian*? What of the warlords who passively or actively assisted the Japanese? What of the criminal groups and the secret societies? The

infamous Shanghai No. 76 counterintelligence murder squad? What of those who cooperated more passively; the welcoming “peace committees” the Japanese frequently found outside of towns abandoned by retreating Nationalist forces, composed of local notables who were ready with plans for continued administration under Japanese control? What of the businessmen who used their contacts with Japanese administrators to speculate on gold markets at the public expense, or those who broke with anti-Japanese boycotts? And what of Wang Jingwei’s infamous puppet regime, which requested that China be allowed to declare war against the United States alongside Japan, and helped the Japanese kill Communists? In one battle between Communist and Japanese forces in Neihuang county, Communist forces killed more than eight thousand Chinese puppet troops, while killing only one thousand Japanese.^{vi}

To further confuse the issue is the fact that collaborators were treated so inconsistently after the Japanese surrender. The trials were brief and concluded quickly by 1946. The Nuremberg trials, in contrast, were media spectacles that ran on for four years. Chiang initially appeared reluctant to prosecute members of Wang’s puppet government, many of whom were former members of his own party. Those not executed were mostly freed before the communist advance^{vii} as Chiang withdrew towards Taiwan. “In the end,” notes David Barret, “these people, who were excoriated so roundly at their trials as *hanjian*, served less than four years for their association with the Japanese.”^{viii} One exception was Zhang Xueliang, a singularly *anti*-Japanese warlord who made the mistake of trying to force Chiang to take a more anti-Japanese stance at gunpoint during the Xi’an incident. Zhang was to serve most of the rest of his life as Chiang’s prisoner in Taiwan. Chen Yi, on the other hand, the governor of Fukien province, had strong ties to Japan and spent much time persecuting anti-Japanese

resisters (and flirting with Japanese capitalists, whom he invited to invest in Fukienese mines). He was promoted by Chiang to be Governor of Taiwan, despite massive popular protest.

Those who stayed behind were reprocessed by the Communists, who were inclined to punish them alongside other small fry left-behind Chiang sympathizers, class enemies, counterrevolutionary elements, and common criminals, without much energy spent on spectacle, given that the most famous nationalists and collaborators were safely ensconced in Taiwan. And despite the Rectification campaign of ’42-’43, which forced Japanese and Nationalist spies and sympathizers to “confess” alongside various class enemies, they did not ultimately maintain their tough stance. “A year after the campaign began,” writes Peter Seybolt, “Communist leadership announced that over 90% of those who had confessed were not really traitors or spies . . . and that many had been falsely accused and should be immediately rehabilitated.”^{ix}

This paper will attempt to briefly answer three questions. First, why did a given Chinese person collaborate and what did that collaboration involve? Second, what criteria were involved in the decisions made by victorious nationalists and Communists to prosecute such collaborators, or not? Third, what can this history tell us about the state of Chinese nationalism at the time?

Why Collaborate?

Before I answer this question directly, let us consider why and how the Chinese resisted. The development of a unified resisting Chinese body was complicated deliberately by Japan. Japanese wartime strategy in China did not propose to conquer and annex the entire country, but rather to occupy and control strategic “points and lines” long enough to extract maximum resources with minimum troop strength, preserving troops for the

Pacific theater. Thus the Japanese strategy leaned heavily towards attempts to co-opt regional political leaderships who could subdue and stabilize their respective areas without Japanese military commitment. This strategy also meant that Chinese resistance leaders could maintain control of their respective “base areas” without undue pressure from Japanese forces. The Communists, the Nationalists, and the slumgullion of warlords were able to survive and squabble without cooperating with each other unduly.

For the same reason, Chinese military forces, as uncoordinated as they were, were incapable of inflicting any sort of decisive defeat on the Japanese, and the Chinese people largely recognized this. “The disastrous practice of ignoring superior Western armaments and relying on the people's spirit,” notes Henrietta Harrison, “had, it seemed, been finally demonstrated in the failure of the Boxer movement.” As a result, Chinese political discourses of resistance exhibited an increasing valorization of pragmatism and realism, as evidenced by the appearance of terms like *kongyan* (empty talk) and *shixing* (real action) in political debates as early as 1896. During the debate over the “resistance while negotiating” strategy, the *Duli Pinglun* journal brought up the failure of Qing minister Li Hongzhang negotiations with the Japanese. “Li's failure was not due to compromise,” the author wrote, “but to not knowing how to compromise.”^x

Post-war heroic posturing aside, the leadership consensus among both Nationalists and Communists during the war was that China must employ a strategy of “resisting while negotiating.” There was little real disagreement on this issue. According to Wang Ke-Wen, Chiang had frequently been more “pro-Japanese” than Wang Jingwei. With Japan's invasion of Manchuria in 1931, Chiang adopted a slogan “first internal pacification, then external resistance” which meant that the government would first defeat

the communists before challenging Japan directly. Later Chiang wrote an article called “Enemy or Friend” in which he described Wang Jingwei's “resistance while negotiating” strategy as ineffective and called instead for a “genuine and lasting peace” between China and Japan. “It was the first time since 1932 since [Chiang] had indicated disapproval of Wang's Japan policy,” Wang Ke-Wen notes, “and it was for not being conciliatory enough.”^{xi}

As for the Communists, in their militarily weakened state, they were hardly in the position to call for “the Kuomintang government [to] change its present policy of passive resistance and employ all its military strength in active warfare against Japan.” However, when Mao faced his peer critics within the party, he had to defend a policy of guerilla warfare that involved as much retreat as advance, from both the Japanese and from Chiang. “Of course,” he said in one communiqué, “to fight for every inch of land does not mean following the ‘old Left’ line of ‘not abandoning a single inch of land in the base area’.”^{xii} When the Communists retreated after engaging in aggressive land reform, they frequently had to abandon their newfound peasant constituencies to Nationalist or Japanese forces, who frequently reinstalled their former, vengeful landlords.

Therefore discuss collaboration rationally, we must consider the options available to those left behind the lines. Whatever their sentimental attachment to the Chinese nation, loyalty was neither sword nor shield. Expressing it was risky, acting on it even riskier, not just to oneself but to one's family and wider community who were effectively hostage to Japanese reprisals. The endemic social instability also opened up power vacuums, not all of them filled by Japanese commanders. Even utmost ideological passivity was no defense against those who would use the cover of war to steal. Collaborators, therefore, tended to adopt either defensive or opportunistic strategies,

depending on the actor and the context. Defensive strategies were largely considered justifiable. Wang Jingwei's wife, for example, a defiant and foolhardy woman who had helped her husband plant bombs in Beijing during the Nationalist revolution, garnered a round of applause during her trial for energetically insisting that Wang had not lost an inch of Chinese territory; such territory had already been abandoned, she argued, by cowardly army officers retreating to safety.^{xiii}

Who were the collaborators?

Chinese collaborators- and I use the term very loosely- can be usefully divided into several classes, motives, and allegiances. First and foremost were the most short-sighted opportunists in any society- the criminal underclass. Composed of the usual suspects who benefit from periods of disorder of whatever kind, the rise in the fortunes of such an underclass was an unavoidable product of war and of China's particular history of recent social instability. The Japanese, as insensitive as they were, realized that their goal of pacifying the country on the cheap could not be achieved if they were to associate themselves with criminal outcasts, but for them and many others there was frequently no alternative. Unfortunately China already had, thanks to its long history of warlordism, opium, and chaos, a well-established opportunistic criminal element. These groups had no consistent ideology apart from the loyalties and affections of the gang leadership. Nevertheless, the Japanese, Wang Jingwei, Chiang Kai-shek, and Mao all had their various flirtations with the underworld. Mao, for example, facing the failure of his land reform scheme during the Autumn Harvest campaign, abandoned the attempt and instead buttressed his forces with recruits straight out of a gang of peasant bandits. Wang's Shanghai government, lacking direct control over military forces and unable or unwilling to use Japanese troops directly, chose to recruit out of the Shanghai underworld for their security.

Both the Japanese and the Nationalists attempted to control and profit from the opium market. And everyone used the agents of the underworld to conduct unsavory intelligence operations in which loyalty to anyone or anything is the first and tritest of lies.

Unsurprisingly these actors produced the most unsavory stories of collaboration. Wu Lantian, for example, was a former head of bureau in for the CCP in Henan. He defected from the CCP to the Japanese in response to the CCP's disciplinary efforts to curb his rampant womanizing and his taste for banditry. Wu turned against Communist forces in the Ji-Lu-Yu base area, and against his local constituency. He was so predatory, extractive, and murderous, the local populace in Neihuan county called him "Great God of Plague" and the "Living King of Hell." Wu and one of his wives allegedly took particular pleasure in capturing his former comrades and torturing them to death. He teamed up with a Red Spear leader named Sun Buyue to fight Communists and enacted a rein of Japanese-coordinated terror in Neihuan that resulted in the destruction of over a hundred villages and over four thousand dead in a single operation.^{xiv}

The Red Spears, however, offer another facet of Chinese collaboration. Where a criminal gang is motivated by opportunism, a secret society is motivated by a responsibility to protect a local or particular interest. Two sides of the same coin in some cases, but groups like the Red Spears were not mere opportunists; rather their loyalty was of a smaller denomination. As peasant defensive groups that had evolved during the warlord era, they were charged with protecting family, home, village, and religion; they tended to cooperate with the Japanese if they suspected (with some justification) that the Nationalists and Communists intended to uproot their temples to replace "superstition" with "modernity." Likewise, due to their alignment with traditional lineage power groups and

conservative peasant political structures, they were frequently resistant to land reform proposals. Nevertheless, both Chiang and Mao used secret societies when they could. All in all the existence and ideology of groups like the Red Spears or the Small Swords (who held pro-Japanese, pro-imperialism rallies) signified a weak state presence. "The Red Spears," comments Seybolt, "were playing their traditional role of protectors of property. This was their main purpose, not the expulsion of an invader, foreign or otherwise."^{xv} They could be used in cases of confluent interests but rarely mobilized for more abstract sacrifices.

Forming a third aspect of "small fry" collaborators were local governing elites. Thanks to China's particular history with warlordism and chaos, these petty leadership groups were unfortunately experienced in coping with warlord armies at the gates, and knew too well the dangerous forces unleashed by the destruction of social control, particularly the ravaging, "recklessly opportunistic" criminal forces.^{xvi} Unable to anticipate the nature of the new occupiers in advance, they might have consoled themselves with the fact that the warlord armies had "often appeared as alien and threatening as did the later Japanese."^{xvii}

Taken as a group, these actors, when prosecuted for collaboration, were generally prosecuted for collaboration alongside other charges, such as outright criminal behavior, selling opium, exploiting peasants, and so on. During the Communists campaigns against landlords, collaboration was frequently added as a garnish to charges of exploitation, and indeed frequently landlords had cooperated with Nationalist or Japanese forces to protect their own interests. The identification of class struggle with national struggle was a Communist conceit. Yet while the communists did punish "real or suspected collaborationists as part of the class war being carried out in the villages, . . . apart from occasional brief appearance on the public

stage by former collaborators, little mention was made, apart from terse pejorative references, to the phenomenon of wartime collaboration."^{xviii} Ultimately the CCP was not to attempt to destroy or drive out China's capitalists using collaboration as a pretext; they would be needed for the national recovery to come . . . and to serve as mobilizing scapegoats during anti-rightist campaigns.

As for the urban capitalists, although one might expect the most overt collaboration by business war profiteers, unfortunately for the aspiring Chinese capitalist opportunist, such opportunities were distinctly limited. "However tempted Chinese capitalists might have been to collaborate," says Barrett, "they quickly discovered they would never enjoy equality with the occupiers."^{xix} China was to serve as an exporter of raw materials and a consumer of Japanese manufactured goods, not a business competitor. The Japanese wartime strategy was to restrict war-profiteering to Japanese capitalists. This tactic backfired, as it gave Chinese businessmen little alternative but to support the Nationalists or occasionally, as Mao himself admitted, the Communists.

Sometimes they did so at the same time. Parks Coble documents the practice of small Chinese capitalist families of playing all angles: "neither patriots nor collaborators by choice, many families of capitalists dispatched their various constituent branches to invest with opposing political camps simultaneously, splitting political risks . . . Even though some ended up being charged as collaborators, enough members of the same family would have cultivated sufficiently strong political ties elsewhere to salvage the family's fortunes."^{xx}

There was, however, an alternative way for Chinese capitalists to profit from the war, generally involving non-productive speculation in the currency and stock markets, and in gold in particular. These markets rose and fell on the fortunes of the war and the

intentions of the Japanese occupiers. According to Wen-Hsin Yeh's description of wartime Shanghai, "those with political connections with the state machinery and inside information reaped huge profits playing the stock and commodity markets."^{xxi} The general result was the accrual of substantial wealth to a lucky few at the top at the expense of the middle and lower classes. At the end of the war, many such speculators, including notables from Shanghai's banking houses, were executed as *hanjian*.

As for the political elites, the situation was complicated by similarity. Most of the puppet elite's ideological position was indiscernible from the Nationalists when stripped of politics and personality, and many of them were quite idealistic. Some of them were former Communists and not unsympathetic to Communist critiques; others may have genuinely believed "Better Tokyo than Moscow." Theirs was not a case of "committed, ideological identification" with the enemy.^{xxii} In terms of disinterested collaborationism with Nazi Germany, the field is well-stocked with prominent names, from Charles Lindbergh to William Joyce (a.k.a. Lord Haw-Haw) to the hapless and harmless P.G. Wodehouse.^{xxiii} In the case of China, however, we are hard put to find figures similarly motivated, largely because the only "common" ideology available was Pan-Asianism, which was rendered ridiculous by the fratricidal behavior of Japanese military forces.^{xxiv} The Chinese collaborators were opportunists, survivors, and fools, but few of them could maintain any ideological attachment to Japan because Japan left little room for it.

Wang Jingwei's decision to collaborate was a poor choice made from a field of few palatable options, but Wang himself was motivated at least partly by an idealistic desire to sacrifice his reputation for the good of the country, which Wang Ke-Wen ascribes to a "romantic longing for martyrdom."^{xxv} In fact some have suggested a tacit operational

accord between Wang and Chiang; one would play the peacemaker and the other the warrior for the common good of the nation. But Wang died before the conclusion of the war, depriving the Nationalists of their most singular symbolic scapegoat- although they did dynamite his mausoleum. As for his seconds, they were singularly unsatisfactory. Chen Gongbo went to the firing squad protesting that not a day had passed that he had not struggled against the Japanese. Zhou Fohai had been assigned an intelligence mission from the Nationalist government *during his tenure with Wang* and served as a sub rosa communications link between Japan and Chiang. Therefore his execution sentence was commuted to life imprisonment.

As for the military commanders who had worked with the Japanese, few wartime collaborators were so lightly punished as those who had controlled military forces. For example, "the entire military command of Wang Jingwei . . . was absorbed directly into the Nationalist army."^{xxvi} Given the ensuing civil war and the continued military dominance of foreign powers, experienced military commanders were required for national defense.

Conclusion

I am not the first to examine the issue of wartime collaboration and nationalism. On the one hand, we have the Taiwanese and PRC historiography, which remains, in the words of Keith Schoppa, "parochially political . . . cast in baldly moralistic frameworks, with scholars invariably attaching to individuals and groups epithets like *hanjian* (traitor to the Chinese), *kuilei* (puppet), and *wei* (bogus)."^{xxvii} Timothy Brook concurs: "Communist rhetoric still cannot bear to name a political organization or position of that period without sticking the label "counterfeit" (*wei*) in front of it."^{xxviii}

At the opposite pole are Prasenjit Duara, Benedict Anderson, and others more inclined

to be skeptical about state-sponsored nationalist histories. Duara would certainly like to rescue Chinese history from those who would use wartime collaboration to attack contemporary political opponents. Such perspectives are naturally skeptical of charges of treason, collaboration, and espionage, inclined to view them as tactics of state mobilization. Henrietta Harrison takes what is perhaps the most extreme view^{xxix}; “as we look closer, the difference between heroic resistance and treacherous collaboration seems to vanish.”^{xxx} Dongyoun Hwang argues that the only difference between the collaborators and their accusers was the way they envisioned the responsibility of the state. He argues that the most salient feature of the collaborator trials was the revelation of the GMD’s “innate corruption, degeneracy and inabilities as a central state.”^{xxxi} Thus collaboration, as a term, says less about the accused than the accuser.

There is much explanatory power in these perspectives. They allow us to explain how charges of collaboration with the Japanese (or the Russians, or the Americans etc.) were used to rally and mobilize the Chinese around the banner of the accuser. They also explain why the convicted were “paroled” so quickly. Such charges were also a convenient way of writing a regime-friendly history through the press and mass media, and this explains why the Communists and Nationalists spent so much time debating the collaboration issue in the press.

However, it would be inaccurate to use the context and treatment of collaboration in China to support a top-down manufactured view of a Chinese nationalism without authentic roots and deny any significance to collaboration charges. For starters, not all collaborator trials were conducted by the state. Some infamous collaborators were executed at the hands of enraged mobs of aggrieved citizens. Second, accusations of collaboration had limited utility. For example, accusing someone of collaborating with the USSR was

a frequent tactic but gained little popular traction in the context of the anti-Japanese war. Third, as Boyle points out, the actual national emotional sentiment of the Chinese, however constructed and however unevenly distributed, was nevertheless a singular obstacle to Japanese efforts to manufacture a Chinese nationalism (or regionalisms) that would serve their interests. Nationalist expression could be blocked but not steered. The inability to recognize the strength of Chinese nationalism was the downfall of the Japanese strategy in China, which hinged on an assumption that Chinese nationalism was a passing fad that could be conveniently and shallowly coopted by puppets like Pu-yi and Wang Jingwei, whom Japan took little trouble to provide even the slightest vestiges of legitimacy. “Only this psychological deficiency,” says John Hunter Boyle, “could explain how Japan could insist on the resignation of Chiang Kai-shek as a condition for an armistice . . . oblivious to the advice fact [that] Chiang was a powerful symbol of the new national mood.” Instead Japan imposed a humiliating treaty on Wang, stripped him of any vestige of patriotic legitimacy, and then expected him to “regain that appeal by posing with her as co-liberators of a country oppressed by Soviet and Western imperialism.”^{xxxii} Japan did this despite the advice of her own China specialists, most of whom had a much higher opinion of Chinese nationalism than the military clique did.

It is tempting to read too much, or far too little, into the phenomenon of wartime collaboration in China. I will, however, attempt three cautious conclusions.

First, it is a common fallacy among political elites that mobilized violence against an external enemy is a short cut to national unification. The European powers, on the brink of World War I, hoped the war would revitalize their societies “as swimmers into cleanness leaping.” For a more contemporary example, post-communist Serbian military doctrines deliberately set forth to incite enemy

forces to incur civilian casualties, which they believed would radicalize and mobilize the populace for war.

And yet violence generally serves to obscure the sincerity of nationalist sentiment, not clarify it, and this is particularly true in the case of China. The endemic violence and struggle of the anti-Japanese served to separate motive and sentiment from behavior. Apart from the suicidal and those who had already lost everything, the behavioral options available to rational Chinese actors were largely limited by whatever force was occupying their region. It was one thing to ask for expressions of loyalty to the nation. But what actions did such behavior entail? Wang Jinwei could have stayed and fought the Japanese without any army behind him, and been shot. He could have fled with Chiang, certain in the knowledge that the Japanese would find someone else; someone more dedicated to serving the Chinese constituents behind Japanese lines, or someone more dedicated to exploiting them. There was no way to assess which action was more loyal. Regardless of intention and sincerity, one had to act pragmatically regardless of nationalist sentiment, and the relatively mild treatment of the *hanjian* after the war testified to the Chinese appreciation of this fact, not to the state of the national identity. This distorting effect explains why both Japanese and Chinese leaders had such difficulty reading nationalist sentiment and turning it to their own ends.

Second, whether the national identity was muddled or not, I suggest that the varying treatment of collaborators in Asia was more indicative of the state and quality of *the colonial experience* in the respective countries and regions. For example, Sukarno, the first president of Indonesia, worked closely and non-confrontationally with the Japanese during the war and was decorated by the Emperor Hirohito. Subhash Chandra Bose led a Japanese-sponsored Indian army against the British without much cost to his

nationalist reputation. In the Philippines, where Japanese policies were far more oppressive than in Indonesia, the head of the collaborating government, José Laurel, was nevertheless granted post-war amnesty by the Philippine government, and subsequently ran successfully for public office several times.

But China was different. Where Japan could successfully use Sukarno and Bose in the course of their struggles against European colonial powers, they could not mobilize the Chinese against the Russians or the British, largely because the harshest Chinese colonial experience, such as it was, occurred under the Japanese. In addition, the Japanese had already defeated Europeans in plain view of the Chinese. To an extent the Japanese were therefore victims of their own success, and they could hardly convince the Chinese that these defeated powers remained more threatening than the Japanese army which raped Nanjing. This is hardly a testimony to the virtues of European colonists but rather to the extraordinary hamfistedness of Japanese militarism.

Third, we must understand Chinese collaboration as a debate over the *expression* of loyalty. Thanks to the particular Chinese history of weakness in the face of invaders, and the repeated failures of idealistic/utopian uprisings against the Qing and foreign occupiers, Chinese discourses of loyalty had developed, by necessity, a nuanced vocabulary of resistance, cooperation, and of loyalty that allowed a measure of dignity, of nationalism, and of altruism to those who survived and accommodated. Those who worked with the Japanese, for purposes defensive or opportunistic, selfish or altruistic, could all make easy use of this rhetoric to defend themselves from charges of disloyalty. As their relatively light treatment demonstrates, they were generally successful in doing so. Given the history of the war and the nature of the tactics deployed, it was difficult for elites to accuse those trapped behind enemy lines of cowardice. It was quite easy to demand

spoken loyalty to the nation; from idealists like Wang Jingwei to utterly criminal opportunists, the Japanese generally allowed people to mouth pro-Chinese slogans provided they were not attached to any agenda of actual resistance. But neither Chiang nor Mao could demand that those behind the lines should stand up and fight to the death given that they themselves were unwilling to do so. Therefore, the most important criteria for deciding whether a given person would be charged with collaboration appeared to be the anticipated *future* threat such a person posed to the political authority or program.

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Notes

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- ⁱ Quoted in Spence, Jonathan D. *The Search for Modern China*. New York: Norton. 1990. p371.
- ⁱⁱ Boyle, John Hunter. *China and Japan at War, 1937-1945: the Politics of Collaboration*. Stanford University Press: Stanford, CA. 1972. p330.
- ⁱⁱⁱ Quoted in Boyle p.153
- ^{iv} Quoted in Harrison, Henrietta. *China: Inventing the Nation*. Oxford University Press, New York. 2001. p218.
- ^v Anderson, Benedict. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism*. New York: Verso.1983. p85.
- ^{vi} Seybolt, Peter. "The War within a War: A Case Study of a County on the North China Plain" *Chinese Collaboration with Japan, 1932-1945: The Limits of Accommodation*. Eds. Barrett, David P. and Larry N. Shyu. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. 2001. p219
- ^{vii} "As they marched into the city on 31 January 1949, the Communists found the prisons of Beijing almost entirely empty." Dikotter, Frank "Crime and Punishment in Post-Liberation China: The Prisoners of

a Beijing Gaol in the 1950s" *The China Quarterly*. No. 149. (Mar. 1997) p147.

^{viii} Barrett, David. "Introduction" *Chinese Collaboration with Japan, 1932-1945: The Limits of Accommodation*. Eds. Barrett, David P. and Larry N. Shyu. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. 2001. p13

^{ix} Seybolt, Peter J. "Terror and Conformity: Counterespionage Campaigns, Rectification, and Mass Movements, 1942-1943" *Modern China*, Vol. 12, No. 1. (Jan., 1986), pp. 39-73.

^x Wang Ke-Wen "Wang Jingwei and the Policy Origins of the 'Peace Movement'". *Chinese Collaboration with Japan, 1932-1945: The Limits of Accommodation*. Eds. Barrett, David P. and Larry N. Shyu. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. 2001.

^{xi} Wang Ke-Wen "Wang Jingwei and the Policy Origins of the 'Peace Movement'". *Chinese Collaboration with Japan, 1932-1945: The Limits of Accommodation*. Eds. Barrett, David P. and Larry N. Shyu. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. 2001.

^{xii} Mao Zedong. "The Situation and Our Policy after the War of Victory Against Japan." August 13, 1945

^{xiii} Boyle p362.

^{xiv} Seybolt, Peter. "The War within a War: A Case Study of a County on the North China Plain" *Chinese Collaboration with Japan, 1932-1945: The Limits of Accommodation*. Eds. Barrett, David P. and Larry N. Shyu. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. 2001. p219

^{xv} Seybolt, Peter. "The War within a War: A Case Study of a County on the North China Plain" *Chinese Collaboration with Japan, 1932-1945: The Limits of Accommodation*. Eds. Barrett, David P. and Larry N. Shyu. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. 2001. p209

^{xvi} Lo Jiu-Jung "Survival as Justification for Collaboration, 1937-1945" *Chinese Collaboration with Japan, 1932-1945: The Limits of Accommodation*. Eds. Barrett, David P. and Larry N. Shyu. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. 2001. p128

^{xvii} Barrett p10

^{xviii} Barrett 14-16

^{xix} Barrett p14

^{xx} Coble, Parks M. "Chinese Capitalists and the Japanese: collaboration and resistance in the Shanghai area, 1937-45. *Wartime Shanghai*. Wen-hsin Yeh ed. London: Routledge. 1998.

^{xxi} Wen-hsin Yeh. "Introduction: the struggle to survive." Wartime Shanghai. Wen-hsin Yeh ed. London: Routledge. 1998.

^{xxii} Barrett, David. "Introduction" Chinese Collaboration with Japan, 1932-1945: The Limits of Accommodation. Eds. Barrett, David P. and Larry N. Shyu. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. 2001. p8

^{xxiii} Who did not collaborate in any real sense but was excoriated for allowing himself to be manipulated by Nazi propagandists.

^{xxiv} . . . which Wang clung to pathetically, calling Chiang a "usurper" who had "betrayed [italics mine] the principles of Greater Pan-Asianism."xxiv

^{xxv} Wang p35

^{xxvi} Barrett, David. "Introduction" Chinese Collaboration with Japan, 1932-1945: The Limits of Accommodation. Eds. Barrett, David P. and Larry N. Shyu. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. 2001. p13

^{xxvii} Schoppa, R. Keith. "Patterns and Dynamics of Elite Collaboration in Occupied Shaoxing County" Chinese Collaboration with Japan, 1932-1945: The Limits of Accommodation. Eds. Barrett, David P. and Larry N. Shyu. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. 2001. p 156.

^{xxviii} Brook, Timothy. "The Creation of the Reformed Government in Central China, 1938" *ibid.* p 84

^{xxix} Barring St. Exupery's prosaic call for traitors to be decorated.

^{xxx} Harrison p219.

^{xxxi} Hwang, Dongyoun. "Wartime collaboration in question: an examination of the postwar trials of the Chinese collaborators" Inter-Asia Cultural Studies, Volume 6, Number 1, 2005

^{xxxii} Boyle, John Hunter. China and Japan at War, 1937-1945: the Politics of Collaboration. Stanford University Press: Stanford, CA. 1972. p 340.